-2- 1856, NOVEMBER 19. 1 AM FROM NEW YORK


IN SPITE OF ASSURANCES WE HAD RECEIVED DIRECTLY FROM HIGHEST LEVELS OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT NO OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA AND MORE SPECIFICALLY NO WEAPONS THERE CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS IN U.S., SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN SECRETLY INTRODUCED INTO CUBA AT SAME TIME WE WERE RECEIVING THESE ASSURANCES. YET PRESIDENT, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY THIS REVELATION, DID NOT THEREUPON TAKE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THESE WEAPONS AS WE HAD FULL CAPACITY TO DO. INSTEAD PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH MISLED BY THESE ASSURANCES, DETERMINED UPON ACTION WHICH GAVE BOTH SIDES TIME TO WORK MATTER OUT. THIS WAS FIRST IMPORTANT THING THAT WE HAD DONE. THIS WAS DONE IN SPITE OF CONTINUATION OF MR, ZORIN'S FALSE POSITION IN UN.

NEXT, WE HAD ADVISED KUZNETSOV THAT ON TEMPORARY BASIS AND IN ORDER TO AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIET SHIPS WE HAD WORKED OUT HAIL AND PASS ARRANGEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH QUARANTINE ON SOVIET ASSURANCE THAT NO MORE WEAPONS WERE BEING INTRODUCED INTO CUBA FROM SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT HAD DONE THIS TO RELIEVE TENSIONS AND WE WERE GLAD TO NOTE THAT SOVIET PREMIER HAD RESPONDED IN KIND BY PROMPT ACTION IN TAKING OUT 42 MISSILES WHICH SOVIETS STATED THEY HAD INTRODUCED INTO CUBA, AS WELL AS PROVIDING FOR REASONABLE MEANS CHECKOUT AT SEA.

MITTED HIMSELF TO REMOVAL OF JET HOMBERS AS WEAPONS THAT WE CONSIDERED OFFENSIVE, OFFERED TO RAISE QUARANTINE ON ASSURANCE FROM SOVIET PREMIER THAT ORDERS HAD HERN SIVEN TO REMOVE HOMBERS WITHIN LIMITED PERIOD, THIS MAJOR CONCESSION ON PART OF PREST-DENT AS HE HAD STATED AND IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE OCTOBER 27/28 EXCHANGE THAT QUARANTINE WOULD NOT BE LIFTED AND ASSURANCE AGAINST INVASION GIVEN UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN UN VERIFICATION ON GROUND OF REMOVAL OF WEAPONS AND ADEQUATE ASSURANCE AGAINST THEIR REINTRODUCTION. SOVIET PREMIER HAD STATED THAT WEAPONS WERE TO BE SEMCYED UNDER UN OBSERVATION BUT NO STEPS LEADING TO THIS OBSERVATION HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED DUE LARGE PART TO CHOURACY OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH WE FELT SOVIET UNION IN

POSITION






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POSITION TO COMPEL CUBA TO PERMIT SUCH OBSERVATION WE AWARE IRRESPONSIBILITY OF CASTRO AND HAVE SINCERELY ATTEMPTED TO COOPERATE WITH SOVIET UNION PENDING SUCH TIME AS VERIFICATION WORKED OUT. THIS PROBLEM RELATED TO SOVIET COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS TO GUARD AGAINST REINTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS. WE AWARE THIS NOT EASY PROBLEM BUT MUST BE SOLVED AND-DOES NO GOOD TO PRETEND THAT PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST OR THAT ONE CAN ACT AS IF PRIOR CONDITIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN FULFILLED. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN.

BEMOVAL OF BOMBERS CANNOT BE INDEFINITELY POSTPONED BASED ON ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SOME VAGUE FUTURE EVENT. OFFER TO LIFT QUARANTINE VERY DIFFICULT STEP FOR PRESIDENT TO TAKE INASMUCH AS HE HAD ANNOUNCED TO NATION THAT LIFTING OF QUARANTINE WAS DEPENDENT UPON UN OBSERVATION AND UPON RECEIPT OF ADEQUATE ASSURANCE AGAINST REINTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS. IN OTHER WORDS. PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO WAIVE ONE OF PRECONDITIONS EVEN THOUGH PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT US DEMANDING THAT NO RELIEF FROM QUARANTINE BE GIVEN UNTIL ALL CONDITIONS MET. PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN THIS ACTION LARGELY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PREMIER'S PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ACTION IN REGARD TO MISSILES. THIS ACTION SHOWS WE ARE NEITHER TRYING TO STARVE OUT CUBANS NOR TO BE UNRESPONSIVE TO-ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY SOVIET UNION. IF THIS OFFER DOES NOT RESULT IN REMOVAL OF BOMBERS PRESIDENT WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO REIMPOSE QUARANTINE IN FULLY EFFECT-IVE FORM, EFFORT TO RELATE REMOVAL OF BOMBERS TO SOME FINAL CONCLUCIONS REGARDING VERIFICATION AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR GUARANTEE. ING AGAINST REINTRODUCTION IS NO MORE APPROPRIATE THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DELAY REMOVAL OF MISSILES. MCCLOY SUGGESTED THOUGH HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIS GOVERNMENT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO WORK ARRANGEMENTS OUT FOR CHECKING OUT HOWERS WITHOUT STOPPING SOVIET SHIPS AS HAD HEEN ARRANGEMENT WITH MISSILES. MCCLOY THEN STATED THAT PRESIDENT WAS GOING TO HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS TUESDAY: THAT HE HAD POSTPONED IT IN THE INTEREST OF GIVING BOVIETS AMPLE OFFORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST REGARDING IL-2815 BUT ON TUESDAY HE WILL HAVE TO SAY SCHETHING ABOUT BOMBERS. PRESIDENT WILL BE PLACED IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION IF NOT ABLE



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TO SAY THAT SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO GET BOMBERS OUT WITHOUT FURTHER CUMDITIONS. IF HE CANNOT DO THIS IT WITH PUT IN QUESTION WHETHER IN FACT WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION IN REGARD TO REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA.

MCCLOY NEXT REFERRED TO ASSURANCES THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE IN REGARD TO INVASION. FIRST, HE MADE IT CLEAR WE WERE NOT GOING TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH SO-CALLED DOCUMENT FOR WHICH ZORIN HAD BEEN PRESSING, PRESENTING AS IT DOES A LOT OF THINGS NEVER MENTIONED OR COVERED IN LETTERS OF OCTOBER 27-28 AND INCLUDING IN VERY THINLY DISGUISED FORM CONDITIONS CASTRO HAS INSISTED UPON BEFORE HE WILL COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WITH SETTLEMENT OF ISSUE WHICH HE DID SO MUCH TO CREATE. WE WILL NOT SIGN ANY DOCUMENT EMBODYING THESE OR-ANY OTHER SUCH CONDITIONS. WE PREPARED TO GIVE OUR SOLEMN DECLARATION IN UN BASED UPON SOVIET DECLARATION AND FULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENTED THAT HAY T SO OFTEN BEEN SPECIFICALLY STATED. CUBANS CAN MAKE ANY DECLARATIONS THEY SEE FIT IN UN OR ELSEWHERE BUT . WE WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO THEM. CASTRO HAS DEFIED SOVIET UNION. US AND UN AND ANY PROPOSAL TO CONFORM TO HIS WISHES IN RETURN FOR THIS DEFIANCE IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. CERTAINLY IT IS NOTHING WITH WHICHUS CAN BE ASSOCIATED.

US PREPARED, ASSUMING WE CAN DISPOSE OF THE LL 28 MATTER, TO SIT DOWN WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AND ATTEMPT TO DRAW OUR RESPECTIVE DEGLARATIONS IN UN. WE WILL BO ALL WE CAN TO HASTEN AND RECORD THEM. US DECLARATION WILL BE VERY SIMPLE. IT WILL BE NOT TO 'NVADE, ASSUMING FULFILLMENT' OF CONDITIONS AND WE WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEMO TO CR USE OUR GOOD OFFICES IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES TO TAKE SAME PUSITION AS WE DO ASSUMING CUBA DOES NOT INSTITUTE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEM, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE MUCH TROUBLE IN DEALING WITH WORDING OF DECLARATION BUT ARE ONLY WASTING TIME IN TALKING ABOUT ANY SUCH DOCUMENT AS HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO US BY KUZNETSOV. MCCLOY ALSO REFERRED TO FACT THAT ANY SUGGESTION OF DOCUMENT WITH TWO OR THREE SIGNATORIES APPENDED TO

IT SUCH




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IT SUCH AS WAS SUGGESTED BY SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE ON CHARACTER OF TREATY WHICH MIGHT WELL REQUIRE CONSENT OF TWO_THIRDS OF SENATE AND IT MIGHT BE YEARS BEFORE SUCH CONSENT COULD BE OBTAINED. MOREOVER, IN MCCLOY'S JUDGMENT WOULD NEVER BE RECOMMENDED TO SENATE BY PRESIDENT. WAY TO PROCEED IS TO GET IL_28 ISSUE SETTLED AND THEY WOULD FIND US QUICK TO GIVE OUR BEST THOUGHT TO NEXT STEPS TO WIND UP WHOLE TRANSACTION.

THERE WAS NO DOUBT, THAT WE HAVE PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH VERIFICATION AND REINTRODUCTION BUT SUGGESTION THAT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CASTRO'S CONSENT WE SHOULD HAVE RECIPROCAL ON OBSERVATION IN US AS WELL AS IN CUBA IS SOMETHING ENTIRELY NEW AND NEVER CONTEMPLATED BY OCTOBER 27-28 EXCHANGE. WE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO APPEASE CASTRO IN THIS FORM. NO INSPECTION OF US WOULD BE RECIPROCAL WITHOUT INSPECTION ALSO OF SOVIET UNION.

AT THIS POINT MCCLOY SAID THAT ONE OF REASONS THAT CAUSED US TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT ASSURANCES REGARDING REINTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS INTO CUBA WAS FULL DEVELOPMENT NOW OF OUR INFORMATION IN REGARD TO EXTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA. WE WERE NOT INTRODUCING ANY NEW CONDITIONS BUT WE WERE POINTING OUT THAT MILITARY PRESENCE THERE SO FAR TRANSCENDED ANY TECHNICIAN STATUS THAT WE HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THIS MATTER OF REINTRODUCTION. WE HAD CONFIRMED PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT COMMAND AND PRESENCE OF NUMBER OF FULLY MAN TED SOVIET COMBAT TEAMS ORGANIZED IN PRECISELY SAME MANNER AS ARMY UNITS IN SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED UNITS AND AT PROPER TIME WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE EVIDENCE OF THIS MILITARY COMMAND BEFORE UN OR ELSEWHERE. WE WERE CONVINCED THAT INTRO-DUCTION OF THESE UNITS AND FORMATION OF THIS COMMAND WAS COMPENENT OF WHOLE ATTEMPT TO CHANGE NUCLEAR BALANCE BY INTRO-*CUCTION OF MUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO CUBA. THEY BORE NO RELATION TO THE DEFENSE OF CUBA AS SUCH BUT WERE PART OF DEFENSE OF SOVIET MISSILE BATTERIES THAT HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN CUBA.

THERE





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
THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF "NORMALIZATION" OF CONDITIONS IN CARIBBEAN AS LONG AS THESE UNITS WERE THERE IN THIS FORM AND QUANTITY. AS LONG AS THEY WERE THERE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SURREPTITIOUS REINTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO CUBA WHICH THESE UNITS WOULD AGAIN BE IN POSITION TO DEFEND, EXISTS. SOVIET UNION MUST THEREFORE UNDERSTAND OUR CAUTION IN REGARD TO ASSURANCE AGAINST REINTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS AND GIVING OF OUR OWN ASSURANCE AGAINST INVASION. MCCLOY EMPHASIZED WE WERE NOT INTRODUCING ANY NEW CONDITIONS BUT WERE SIMPLY POINTING OUT EMPHASIS WHICH WE HAD TO PLACE ON PRESENCE OF THESE UNITS AND THEIR RELATION TO MATTER OF REINTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE ARE QUITE AS ANXIOUS AS SOVIET UNION TO WIND UP THIS TRANSACTION FOR THERE ARE NUMBER OF THINGS WE OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSING IN ORDER TO KEEP THIS SITUATION FROM ARISING AGAIN. TODAY IT IS CUBA AND COMBINATION OF THIS BEARDED FIGURE WHO IS DICTATOR IN COBA AND CERTAIN MISCALCULATION ON PART OF SOVIET UNION THAT ALMOST BROUGHT US TO WAR. TOMORROW IT MAY BE SOMETHING ELSE. IN THIS CONNECTION MCCLOY SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT CHINESE-INDIAN WAR. THIS SEEMED TO BE REACHING VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTIONS, IT COULD EASILY DEVELOP INTO SOMETHING THAT WOULD GAUSE BOTH OF US TROUBLE IN FUTURE AND HE WONDERED WHAT THINKING OF SOVIET UNION WAS IN REGARD TO THIS. IT MAY NOT BE TOO SOON FOR US TO EXCHANGE SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT IT SO THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT HASTILY AND WITHOUT CAREFUL PRIOR THOUGHT IF WE WERE FACED WITH SOME DEVELOPMENT THERE THAT AGAIN CHALLENGED PEACE OF THE WORLD. DID KUZNETSOM HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT CHINA AND HOW THIS WAR COULD BE KEST FROM BECOMING NEW THREAT TO PEACE?

TO THIS KUZNETSOV RESPONDED THAT THIS SITUATION CAUSED THEM SOME CONCERN. THAT WAS PROBLEM THAT TROUBLED THEM AND PERHAPS AT SOME TIME SOME DISCUSSION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN ABOUT IT. SAID THAT THIS WAS HIS VIEW BUT HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AT THIS POINT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS

SITUATIONS

TOP SECRET



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SITUATIONS SUCH AS THIS THAT POINTED TO NECESSITY FOR CONCLUDING CUBAN AFFAIR PROMPTLY SO THAT OTHER MATTERS AND PROBLEMS OF CONCERN TO US BOTH COULD BE FACED WITH BEHEFIT OF SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF CUBAN PROBLEM BEHIND US.

KUZNETSOV THEN REPEATED POSITION OF SOVIET UNIOU; NAMELY, IHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REMOVAL OF 11_2815 BUT THAT THIS MUST BE DONE IN CONNECTION WITH SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS RELATING TO CUBA. THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE REMOVAL COINCIDE WITH FINAL SOLUTION. HE REPEATED THAT THEY HAD IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE MERELY PUTTING UP ONE OBSTACLE AFTER ANOTHER AND IF 11_25 MATTER WERE SOLVED WE WOULD HAVE ANOTHER PRECONDITION. AT THIS POINT HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AT TIME 11_2815 WERE REMOVED TO STOP OUR OVERFLIGHTS.

MCCLUY SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED SOVIETS WERE STILL ATTEMPTING TO POSTFONE DEALING WITH BOMBERS UNTIL ALL PROBLEMS CONNECTED, WITH VERIFICATION AND REINTRODUCTION WERE SETTLED. THIS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE SOME CONSULTATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE BEFORE WE COULD GIVE ALL ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION THAT SOVIET UNION WAS SEEKING. MCCLUY AGAIN REFERRED TO NEED FOR CLEARING UP THIS MATTER BEFORE PRESIDENTIS TUESDAY PRESS CONFERENCE. THOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT KUZNETSOV HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT PROPOSAL IN REGARD TO IL-28 S WHICH HAD BEEN OFFERED, HE DID ASK MCCLOY TO REPEAT JUST WHAT OFFER CONSISTED OF WHICH WAS DONE.

KUZNETJUV CAME BACK TO U THANT'S PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL UN OBSERVATION AND EACH TIME HE DID MCCLOY SAID HE FOUND GREAT DIFFICULTIES WITH IT AND STRESSED NECESSITY IF THERE WAS TO BE UN OBSERVATION IN US THERE HAD ALSO TO BE REPOCITY UN OBSERVATION. IN SOVIET UNION.

*KUZNETBOV SAID IN REGARD TO ASSURANCE AGAINST REINTRODUCTION
HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOVIET UNION COULD DO EXCEPT TO SOLEMNLY
DECLARD IT WAS NOT GOING TO REINTRODUCE WEAPONS AND ASKED WHAT
OTHER GUARANTEES WE HAD IN MIND.

KUZNET50V



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
KDEDETOUN ALSO GAID HE WALLED TO REPEAT AT THIS TIME THAT HE WAS NOW AUTHORIZED. TO SAY THAT NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHATSO-EVER WERE AND LONGER ON TERRITORY OF CUHA. PLEASE, HE SAID, DO NOT COMPLICATE STRUCTION BY INSISTING UPON INTERMINABLE TUSPECTION ON GROUND. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GO ALL OVER CUHA TURNING OVER EVERY STONE, LOOKING INTO EVERY CAVE AND INTO EVERY BATHROOM TO DETERMINE WHETHER MUCLEAR WEAPONS STILL EXISTED THERE. THEY WERE GOING TO REAFFIRM THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN REMOVED AND THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO REINTRODUCE THEM.

MCCLOT SATE HE MARTED TO HAVE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT IN ANY WAY CONTEMPLATING STOPPING OF OVERFLIGHTS IN CUBA UNLESS AND UNTIL WE WERE SURE THAT THERE WAS NOT GOING TO BE ANY REINTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS. WE WERE DOING UTNOST TO KEEP OVERFLIGHTS TO MINIMUM BUT IN AUSENCE OF ANY ADEQUATE VERTFICATION THIS WAS ONLY THING WE COULD DO AND HE REPEATED THAT OVERFLIGHTS HAD PROBABLY SAVED US FROM WAR AND THEY MIGHT DO SO AGAIN. MCCLOY MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD RETURN FIRE IF OUR PLANES WERE SHOT AT: THAT WE WERE GOING TO DO AS WE HAD BEEN DOING TO FACE, KEEP OVERFLIGHTS TO MINIMUM NECESSARY TO PROTECT OURSELVED AND HEMISPHERE.

KUZNETGOV WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT. ZORIN WAS AS DIFFICULT AS EVER. AT END KUZNETGOV SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE HAD THIS FRANK DISCUSSION OF OUR POSITION; THAT HE WAS TROUBLED ABOUT OUR POSITION IN REGARD TO VERIFICATION AND ASSURANCES AGAINST REINTRODUCTION AS HE COULD SEE HOW DISCUSSIONS IN REGARD TO THESE MIGHT GO OF THIS REMAINABLY WITH OUR SUITING UP OF TACLES TO GIVING OUR ASSURANCE AGAINST INVASION.

WE LEFT WITH HE DELICATION OF SECURD TO FITTING AND WITH HE MODELLATION RESERVED TO FITTING AND WITH HE REPORT TO THE WORLD GOOD TO THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY O

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KUZNETSOV ALSO SAID HE WANTED TO REPEAT AT THIS TIME THAT HE WAS NOW AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHATSO-EVER WERE ANY LONGER ON TERRITORY OF CUBA. PLEASE, HE SAID, DO NOT COMPLICATE SITUATION BY INSISTING UPON INTERMINABLE INSPECTION ON GROUND. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GO ALL OVER CUBA TURNING OVER EVERY STONE, LOOKING INTO EVERY CAVE AND INTO EVERY BATHROOM TO DETERMINE WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS STILL EXISTED THERE. THEY WERE GOING TO REAFFIRM THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN REMOVED AND THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO REINTRODUCE THEM.

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WE LEFT WITH NO UNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO FUTURE MEETING AND WITH NO INDICATION FROM KUZNETSOV THAT THEY WOULD GIVE WAY IN REGARD TO IL-28'S OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER REMOVAL OF IL-28'S IN CONNECTION WITH SOLUTION OF VERIFICATION AND REINTRODUCTION PROBLEMS.

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MCCLOY ASKED KUZNETSOV IF HE HAD FNY WORD ABOUT MIKOYAN. KUZNETSOV SAID HE STILL HAD NO DEFINITE WORD AS TO WHEN HE WAS COMING BACK.

STEVENSON

UMT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11/19/62, 2:44 AM RNL
PASSED PRINCIPLE OFFICERS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PER S/S-0,
11/19/62 CWO-JRL